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TAKING AIM AT CANNED HUNTS
WITHOUT CATCHING GAME RANCHES IN
THE CROSSFIRE
I. INTRODUCrION
An antelope stands in a field tied to a stake buried in the ground.
Fifty yards away a man with a rifle and a guide arrive, exit their
jeep, and walk toward the skittish animal. The man with the rifle
aims and fires several times at the restrained antelope, striking it
twice in the neck. It struggles, falls to the ground, and dies. This is
a "canned hunt."'
The Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act of 1995 (CEAPA),
a bill introduced in the 104th Congress that did not reach a vote,
endeavored to end canned hunts.2 The U.S. House of Representa-
tives' Subcommittee on Crime3 held hearings on the legislation in
April 1996.4
The relevant portion of the bill states:
§ 48 Exotic animals
(a) Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly transfers, transports, or pos-
sesses a confined exotic animal, for the purposes of
allowing the killing or injuring of that animal for en-
tertainment or the collection of a trophy, shall be
1. See Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1202
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1
(1996) (the subcommittee hearings produced multiple documents, only some of
which have internal pagination) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter House Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of Frank Lautenberg, Sen. (D-
N.J.)).
2. See H.R. 1202,104th Cong. (1995); S. 1493,104th Cong. (1995). Similar legis-
lation was introduced during the 103rd Congress, but failed to get to a vote. See Let-
ter from Harvey Hilderbran, Executive Director, Exotic Wildlife Association, to Ex-
otic Wildlife Association Members (Jan. 11, 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) (referring to H.R. 4997, 103rd Cong. (1994)). It is reasonable
to believe the CEAPA will appear in the 105th Congress.
3. The Subcommittee on Crime falls under the House Committee on the Judici-
ary. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (Hearing Witness List).
4. See id. (Hearing Witness List).
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fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) the term 'confined exotic animal' means a
mammal of a species not historically indigenous
to the United States that in fact has been held in
captivity for the shorter of-
(A) the greater part of the animal's life; or
(B) a period of one year;
whether or not the defendant knew the length of
the captivity; and
(2) the term 'captivity' does not include any pe-
riod during which the animal-
(A) lives as it would in the wild, surviving
primarily by foraging for naturally occurring
food, roaming at will over an open area of at
least 1,000 acres; and
(B) has the opportunity to avoid hunters!
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce.6 Be-
cause the transfer, transport, and possession of exotic animals
(exotics) substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress has
the power to regulate these acts7 even though the regulation of
5. H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
7. Congress can regulate anything having a "substantial relation to interstate
commerce." United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995). Only once in
recent history has legislation passed under the guise of the Commerce Clause been
found unconstitutional for failing to substantially affect interstate commerce. See id.
In Lopez the Supreme Court held the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconsti-
tutional because the regulated activity, possession of a firearm in a school zone, had
no connection with a commercial activity. See id. at 1630-31.
Unlike the activity in Lopez, the trade and transfer of exotics is easily classi-
fied as a commercial activity. Moreover, the CEAPA only prohibits activities "in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce." H.R. 1202; S. 1493. This jurisdictional
element alone satisfies the Commerce Clause. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. Con-
gress will often regulate a disfavored activity by prohibiting interstate commerce of
an item that is incidental to the activity. See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 550-53 (1944) (using the Commerce Clause to
regulate interstate business insurance transactions). For instance, the National Mo-
tor Vehicle Theft Act prohibits the transportation of stolen vehicles across state
lines. See 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1994); see also Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432,
435-36 (1925) (applying an earlier version of the same Act). The Supreme Court
upheld this law as a permissible method to "regulate interstate commerce to the ex-
tent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote
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hunting and chattel are issues normally left to the states.8
The CEAPA has prompted considerable commotion in the
hunting community. Although prohunting groups oppose canned
hunts-or "caged kills" as most hunters refer to the activity-they
see legislation like the CEAPA as a tremendous threat to hunters'
rights. They question the drafters' true motives, the vague and
confusing language of the bill, and the need for federal regulation
in an area usually under the control of the state legislatures.'0
This Comment addresses these concerns while analyzing the
CEAPA itself. Part II considers both the articulated and the un-
articulated purposes of the bill. Part III analyzes how the CEAPA
might be interpreted by those who would be required to imple-
ment it. Part IV discusses the extent of the problem being ad-
dressed by the CEAPA and some of the current state regulations
that deal with the same and similar concerns. Part V contends that
allowing states to solely regulate canned hunts is both reasonable
and necessary. State regulation protects the exotics efficiently,
preserves the exotic animal breeding programs on numerous game
ranches, preserves hunting rights for citizens who enjoy the sport,
and protects those states that rely financially on the industry. Fi-
nally, Part VI proposes two alternatives to the CEAPA: revising
the federal statute to truly address the articulated purposes of the
CEAPA or allowing states to exclusively regulate canned hunting.
immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other
States from the State of origin." Id. at 436. Similar reasoning allowed the Court to
uphold laws regulating the movement of lottery tickets, women, whiskey, and cattle.
See South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 549 (listing numerous cases de-
cided before 1944 under the Commerce Clause). The CEAPA successfully uses the
Commerce Clause to regulate exotics.
8. See Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 617 F.2d 1112, 1126 (5th Cir.
1980) (Fay, J., concurring) ("[T]he open question is one of property law, one of the
few areas traditionally left to the states."); United States v. Chappell Livestock Auc-
tion, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that the "displacement of state
tort law affecting title to personal property [is] an issue traditionally left to the
states").
Not all regulation of hunting is left to the states. For instance, federal law
bans hunting from aircraft. See 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1994).
9. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Frank Lau-
tenberg, Sen. (D-N.J.)); see also Letter from Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus, U.S.
House of Representatives, to Bill McCollum, Chairman, House Subcommittee on
Crime (Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter
CSC Letter] (stating that "the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus and many others in
the hunting and fishing community are strongly opposed to [the CEAPA]").
10. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brew-
ster, Rep. (D-Okla.)).
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II. DUE TO THE CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER OF THE ISSUE AND
THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE PURPOSES BEHIND
THE CEAPA HAVE BEEN PERMANENTLY OBSCURED
Initially, advocates of the CEAPA articulated only one pur-
pose for the legislation-the prevention of canned hunts." Sup-
porters proffered additional reasons for the CEAPA as opposition
grew. 12 Meanwhile, groups and individuals opposing the bill saw
these various articulated purposes as merely a sham fabricated to
disguise the hidden purposes of antihunting groups, such as closing
exotic game ranches13 in the United States, stigmatizing hunters,
and making hunting illegal.1 4 Amid the politics of the legislative
process, the true purposes of the CEAPA are now permanently
obscured.
The original sponsors of the CEAPA in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Congressman George Brown, Jr. of California and
Congressman Porter Goss of Florida, made it clear that the pro-
posed legislation was "not seek[ing] to limit hunting practices in-
volving animals in the wild."'5 When addressing potential cospon-
sors of the CEAPA, Brown and Goss emphasized that the bill was
devised only to prevent "unsportsmanlike" hunting practices, such
as canned hunts. In letters sent to fellow members of Congress,
Brown and Goss referred to over "1,000 'canned hunting' opera-
tions" in the United States in order to convince colleagues that the
legislation was necessary to "protect captive, exotic mammals.'
17
During the April 25, 1996, hearing before the House Sub-
11. See Dear Colleague Letter from George E. Brown, Jr. & Porter J. Goss, U.S.
Congress (Apr. 3, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter April Dear Colleague Letter] (writing in support of the Captive Exotic
Animal Protection Act); Dear Colleague Letter from George E. Brown, Jr. & Porter
J. Goss, U.S. Congress (Feb. 27, 1995) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view) [hereinafter February Dear Colleague Letter] (writing in support of the Cap-
tive Exotic Animal Protection Act).
12. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
13. Game ranches, as referred to in this Comment, are ranches that raise or im-
port native and exotic animals. Many game ranches allow their animals to be
tracked and hunted by private hunters, usually for a fee.
14. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
15. April Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 11; February Dear Colleague Let-
ter, supra note 11.
16. April Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 11; February Dear Colleague Let-
ter, supra note 11.
17. April Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 11; February Dear Colleague Let-
ter, supra note 11.
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committee on Crime,i8 proponents articulated additional reasons
for the CEAPA. The main argument was the need to protect na-
tive species of wildlife from the introduction of nonindigenous
animals that might transmit diseases, interbreed, or compete for
food. 9 Also mentioned was the general need for the regulation of
exotics on a national level because of the interstate transportation
of the animals.2' At the same time Congressman Goss stated, "The
driving force behind the introduction of this legislation was allega-
tions that zoo animals were being sold to certain canned hunt op-
erators for trophy hunting purposes.
21
Opponents of the bill see the issues in a different light. Be-
cause the CEAPA has vague definitions, which require that exot-
ics be kept on 1,000 acres or more in order to avoid classification
as "captive,"" many prohunting groups view the legislation as a
thinly veiled attempt by the Humane Society of the United States
to close down most, if not all, exotic game ranches. 3 The mini-
mum acreage requirement alone would likely have such an effect.
Game ranches under 1,000 acres would no longer be able to make
a profit through the hunting of exotics because under the CEAPA
a hunt on a 900-acre ranch would be a canned hunt.24 Although
the hunt itself would not be illegal, individuals involved in trans-
portation or possession of exotics killed or injured during the hunt
would be criminally liable, putting an end to hunts on smaller
game ranches.2
18. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (Hearing Witness List).
19. See id at 4 (statement of George E. Brown, Jr., Rep. (D-Cal.)); id. at 1
(statement of Frank J. Lautenberg, Sen. (D-N.J.)); id. at 2-3 (statement of Wayne
Pacelle, Vice President of Government Affairs and Media, Humane Society).
20. See id at 5-6 (statement of George E. Brown, Jr., Rep. (D-Cal.)); id. at 2
(statement of Wayne Pacelle, Vice President of Government Affairs and Media,
Humane Society).
21. Id at I (statement of Porter J. Goss, Rep. (R-Fla.)).
22 See H.R. 1202, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1493, 104th Cong. (1995).
23. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Richard
Winters, Jr., President, Exotic Wildlife Association); see also Alfred Lubrano, The
Trophy Fields: 'Canned Hunts' Become Target of Controversy, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al (referring to the CEAPA as part of a "movement to
make the hunting of captive exotics illegal everywhere").
It has been alleged that the Humane Society actually drafted the CEAPA,
merely using Congressmen Porter and Goss as a means of effectuating their goals.
See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 6-7 (statement of Ike C. Sugg, Com-
petitive Enterprise Inst.).
24. See H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
25. The bill only requires "possession" and an effect on interstate commerce. If
a hunter from one state pays to kill a boar on a game ranch in another state, it affects
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Other hunting advocates see the bill as part of an overall,
long-term plan by the Humane Society to vilify hunting and make
it unlawful.2' They point to the fact that the "1,000 'canned hunt-
ing' operations" referred to by Congressmen Brown and Goss is a
figure received from the Humane SocietyY This total includes
most, if not all, legitimategame ranches in the United States that
do not offer canned hunts.
In addition, the bill singles out exotics that are killed for enter-
tainment and trophy collection.29 Almost all hunts, both fair-chase
hunts" and canned hunts, are accomplished, at least in part, for en-
tertainment or trophy collection. 3' As hunting advocates perceive
it, these terms have been added solely to stigmatize the sport.32
The true purposes of the CEAPA probably include all of the
interstate commerce. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 8 (1976) (explaining that a
court may only invalidate legislation under the Commerce Clause if "the relation of
the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent");
Vince Lee Farhat, Note, Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: The Popular Sov-
ereignty Model of Reserved Powers, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1163, 1172 n.81 (1996) ("If
the activity subject to regulation affects interstate commerce in any way, the regula-
tion is constitutional."). See generally Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (holding
constitutional an act designed to protect the environment and public health from the
dangers of the coal production because of the effect on interstate commerce).
Replacement of exotics with nonexotics is also not an option. Most domestic
wildlife cannot be privately owned in the United States unless they are "traditionally
farmed or ranched" because they are owned by the state and federal governments.
See Ike C. Sugg, To Save an Endangered Species, Own One, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
1992, at A10.
26. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brew-
ster, Rep. (D-Okla.)) (arguing that the CEAPA is "about outlawing sport-hunting"
and is a "poorly disguised attempt by animal rights activists to undermine all forms
of hunting"); id. at 2 (statement of Pete Geren, Rep. (D-Tex.)) ("The proponents of
this bill also point to the fees charged to hunt these animals as if this somehow taints
the activity. Paying to hunt is not unique to exotics. ... People pay private land
owners for the opportunity to hunt in every state in this nation.").
27. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Ike C. Sugg,
Competitive Enterprise Inst.).
28. See id.
29. See H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
30. "Fair-chase hunts" are hunts where the animals roam free on the game
ranches. This infers that the animal has a reasonable chance of evasion or escape,
usually equal to that of a similar hunt in the wild. See Exotic Wildlife Ass'n, Code of
Ethics of the Exotic Wildlife Association § 5A(2) (undated) (on file with Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review); National Rifle Ass'n, Draft NRA Hunting Policy: Caged
Kill 1-3 (1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
31. See National Rifle Ass'n, Institute for Legislative Action, Fact Sheet: H.R.
1202 (Jan. 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter NRA
Fact Sheet].
32. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Lamar
Smith, Rep. (R-Tex.)).
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articulated and unarticulated justifications and more. All indi-
viduals and groups involved, both supporters and opponents of the
bill, view the issue differently. If the issue reaches the courts, this
may be problematic because most courts feel an "obligation to
construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed,
of the lawmaking branch of the government." 33 Because the true
purposes of the CEAPA are speculative, courts will have no way
to precisely discern the intent of Congress in order to carry it out.
As a result, courts will be left to decide the true purposes of the
CEAPA, giving the deciding court and the enforcing agency con-
siderable power over the ultimate interpretation of the legislation.
III. INTERPRETING THE CEAPA
A. Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Lack of Sufficient Definitions in the
CEAPA Make Interpretation Troublesome
General and ambiguous words and phrases appear throughout
the CEAPA.34 The legislation's vague language and lack of many
important definitions add to the difficulty in determining how the
law would be interpreted if it passed.
1. Killing the messenger: the knowledge requirement
The CEAPA punishes individuals who "knowingly transferf-,
transport[_], or possess[] a confined exotic animal, for the purpose[]
of allowing the killing or injuring of that animal for entertainment
or the collection of a trophy., 31 It does not punish the person who
does the killing. The person punished is not the hunter,3' as the
crime is not the killing or injuring but the transporting or posses-
sion prior to the killing or injuring. This misdirected effort targets
third parties-the truck driver, the veterinarian, and the ranch
hand-who somehow allow the killing or injuring to occur by
moving or keeping the animal.37
33. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcrION § 45.05,
at 22 (5th ed. 1992).
34. "Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by rea-
sonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses." Id. § 45.02, at 6. A
well-drafted statute has minimal interpretation problems. See id. at 6-7.
35. H.R. 1202,104th Cong. (1995); S. 1493, 104th Cong. (1995).
36. Although certainly the game ranch owner can be reached as a possessor of
the animals.
37. See Florida Cattlemen's Ass'n, Comments on H.R. 1202, at 1 (Apr. 25, 1996)
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Cattlemen's Corn-
January 1997]
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It is not clear if the term "knowingly" applies only to the
transport, transfer, or possession of the animal or if it also applies
to the "allowing" of the injury or death. In other words, while the
actor must have knowledge of the transport, transfer, or posses-
sion, it is not clear if the actor must also have knowledge of what
the third-party owner or hunter intends to do with the animal once
it is no longer in the actor's control.
A similar problem arose in United States v. Yermian,38 which
dealt with the making of false statements to a federal agency. The
statute at issue in Yennian, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, addresses false
statements to the government. It reads as follows:
Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up... or makes any
false ... statements or representations, or makes or uses
any false writing or document knowing the same to con-
tain any false.., statement or entry, shall be fined... or
imprisoned... or both. 9
The Ninth Circuit read "knowingly and willfully" to modify
both the conduct of making a false statement and the fact that the
statement is made to a federal agency.4" The Supreme Court re-
versed.4' The five member majority held that the legislative his-
tory and plain language of the statute supported a finding that the
knowledge requirement only applied to the actor's knowledge re-
garding the statement's untruth . The four member dissent, writ-
ten by Justice Rehnquist, argued that the statute was ambiguous,
requiring a finding in favor of lenity43-a finding that the statute
requires knowledge that the statements are being made to a fed-
eral agency.44 Rehnquist felt that the majority "disregarded the
clearest, albeit not conclusive, evidence of legislative intent," cre-
ating more confusion than it resolved.45
The Yennian case demonstrates the difficulty of applying the
knowledge requirement to other terms in an unclear statute. In
ments].
38. 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
40. See Yermian, 468 U.S. at 67.
41. See id. at 68.
42. See id. at 68-75.
43. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
44. See Yermian, 468 U.S. at 75-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the CEAPA the word "knowingly" may apply to: (1) the knowl-
edge of the transportation; (2) the knowledge that the animal falls
under the definition of a "confined exotic animal"; (3) the knowl-
edge that the animal will or may be killed or harmed; (4) the
knowledge that the killing will be for entertainment or for a tro-
phy; or (5) any combination of these possibilities.
For instance, the level of knowledge a truck driver must have
in order to be culpable is unclear. The CEAPA specifically states
that the defendant is guilty of a violation "whether or not the de-
fendant knew the length of the [animal's] captivity."" If only
knowledge of the animal's transportation is required, and the
driver knows a gazelle is being transported to a game ranch, the
driver has violated the CEAPA. The driver's knowledge that the
destination of the gazelle is a game ranch might alone lead to li-
ability under the CEAPA, as an animal on a game ranch "may" be
killed or injured. However, the driver may be comforted by the
fact that the game ranch is over 1,000 acres. Unfortunately, the
size of the ranch will not do the driver any good if the animal is
then shot in a small pen on the ranch; the driver again may be
guilty of violating the Act.
How is the driver to determine what the shipper intends to do
with the animal after shipment? And how is the truck driver to as-
certain the history of each animal to determine if it is a confined
exotic animal as defined by the CEAPA? Under strict liability it
appears that if the driver diligently sought information on the his-
tory of an animal, but was lied to by a third party, that driver
would still be liable.47 Somehow the driver is expected to know the
mental state of another party; the driver must determine if that
third party will kill or injure the animal at a later time in a manner
that the CEAPA prohibits.
Fortunately for the driver this predicament falls within the
rule of lenity, which provides guidance in the interpretation of
criminal statutes.Y Motivated by the principle that "people de-
serve warning not only of the boundaries of criminal conduct, but
also of the repercussions of crossing those boundaries," the rule of
46. H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
47. "Under a strict-liability statute, a defendant can be convicted even though he
was unaware of the circumstances of his conduct that made it illegal." Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419,443 n.7 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
48. See generally United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 820-22 (3d Cir.)
(discussing cases that have applied the rule of lenity), cert. denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 214
(1996).
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lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be interpreted in
favor of the defendant.49 Unhappily, this did not help the defen-
dant in Yermian,5' and there is no guarantee it will aid our bewil-
dered driver.
While the truck driver faces these questions in court, the per-
son who pays for a canned hunt is immune, as that person did not
transfer, transport, or possess the animal.
2. What is a "confined exotic animal"?
The definition of "confined exotic animal" includes a large
number of animals, but many exotics still fail to receive protection
from canned hunts because of the definition's wording. To be a
confined exotic animal, the animal must be a "mammal of a spe-
cies not historically indigenous to the United States" that has not
been living as it would in the wild in an open area of 1,000 acres or
more with the opportunity to avoid hunters for either the greater
51part of its life or a period of one year.
Completely wild, free-roaming exotics living on a 900-acre
game ranch for over one year constitute confined exotic animals
under the CEAPA. Amazingly, however, if a free-roaming exotic
living more than one year on a game ranch of 1,010 acres is caught,
staked in place, and shot, the animal does not meet the definition
of a confined exotic animal. This anomalous outcome results from
the form of the CEAPA's definitions. As long as the exotic lived
in the "wild" on over 1,000 acres for the greater part of its life and
was not "captive" for more than one year, that animal is not a
confined exotic animal under the bill.52
To be a confined exotic animal, the animal cannot be
"historically indigenous." 53 The words "not... historically indige-
nous" imply that the species did not exist in the United States
within the period of written record. 4 Using this definition, horses,
cattle, swine, donkeys, several species of deer, cats, most dogs, and
goats are not indigenous to the United States.5 An interpretation
49. See, e.g., id.
50. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 76-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
52. See H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
53. H.R. 1202; S. 1493.
54. See Cattlemen's Comments, supra note 37, at 2.
55. See id.; House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brew-
ster, Rep. (D-Okla.)) (explaining that many cattle now raised for beef in the United
States are not indigenous, such as the Texas Longhorn, which was brought from
[Vol. 30:893
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limited to the presence or absence of the species when each state
entered the Union would eliminate many domestic animals, but
determining when and where each animal existed would create se-
rious difficulties.55
Unquestionably, the enforcing agency will have to resolve
these questions.5 The uncertainty of including animals that are
not indigenous makes owners of game ranches and ranches that
raise animals for human consumption nervous.58 Leaving the in-
terpretation to an administrative agency does not allay these
fears.5 9
3. What is "entertainment"?
The term "entertainment" is undefined and unbounded. It is
the type of term that can apply to virtually any activity in its com-
mon usage. The dictionary definition of "entertainment" includes
"amusement," an "agreeable occupation for the mind," and
"something affording pleasure, diversion, or amusement."' Pleas-
ure and amusement are mental states, leading to impossible prob-
lems of evidence and proof.
6 1
For instance, because "entertainment" is evidently required
under the CEAPA, but unbounded in its definition, there is no
way to know if the CEAPA applies to an exotic transported for
subsistence or for profit. There is no way to know what proof is
necessary for an enforcing agency to show that an exotic was killed
for entertainment. Once again, the interpretation of this vague
term by the enforcing agency will significantly alter the final op-
eration of the CEAPA.62
Europe by the Spanish explorers).
56. See Cattlemen's Comments, supra note 37, at 3.
57. See 2B SINGER, supra note 33, § 49.05, at 22 ("[I]f a statute is silent or am-
biguous the [c]ourt may assume that Congress implicitly delegated the interpretive
function to the agency charged with its enforcement.").
58. See CSC Letter, supra note 9.
59. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Edgar
Stokes, President, Fla. Cattlemen's Ass'n) ("Our experience with bureaucrats back
home is ... they can write the rules and regulations to make it mean whatever they
want it to mean.").
60. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 648 (2d ed.
1987).
61. Cf Cattlemen's Comments, supra note 37, at 3-4 (discussing the difficulties
with the mens rea requirement of the CEAPA).
62. See Tanya K. Metaksa, ILA Report: A Canned Attack on Hunting Rights,
AM. HUNTER, Jan. 1996, at 14,14.
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C. Federal Agency Interpretation Under the Administrative
Procedure Act Often Results in the Agency or the Courts Making
Essential Interpretive Determinations
A currently unnamed federal agency will be assigned the task
of interpreting and implementing the CEAPA should it pass.63
From the text and subject matter of the bill, the obvious choices
are the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Inte-
rior's Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Department of Commerce.6
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the agency
charged with implementing the statute will have to do so through
rulemaking, adjudication, or a combination of the two. 65 Rulemak-
ing allows the agency to set forth a general rule to interpret or im-
plement the law.6 Adjudication is aimed at individuals or particu-
lar practices, rather than stating a general rule applicable to
everyone under the statute.67 For example, an agency hearing that
determines how the law applies in a specific factual situation is an
adjudication.68
Agencies create legislative rules and interpretive rules under
the APA 9 Legislative rules are as binding as statutes them-
selves.7 Congress must delegate authority to the agency in order
for it to make legislative rules.71 This delegation can be explicit or
implicit.72 When Congress clearly leaves "a gap for the agency to
63. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996)
(explaining the presumption by the judiciary that any ambiguity in a statute is in-
tended by Congress to be resolved at the discretion of the implementing agency); cf
House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Wayne Pacelle, Vice
President of Government Affairs and Media, Humane Society) (noting the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's administrative ban on the baiting of several types of water-
fowl).
64. Why the bill does not select a specific agency is unknown. This merely in-
creases the confusion and vagueness of the legislation. The details, such as the
naming of an implementing agency, would probably be worked out by a joint com-
mittee of the House and Senate, if the CEAPA ever makes it that far along in the
legislative process.
65. See GARY J. EDLES & JEROME NELSON, FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS:
AGENCY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES § 1.8, at 21-22 (2d ed. 1995).
66. See id. § 1.711, at 18-19 (citing Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. §
551(4) (1994)).
67. See id. at 19.
68. See id. at 18-19.
69. See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.1, at 287 (3d ed. 1994).
70. See id. §§ 6.1, 6.3, at 228,233.
71. See id § 6.3, at 234.
72. See id. at 236.
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fill" 73 or states specifically in the statute that the agency has the
authority to promulgate legislative rules, the delegation is ex-
plicit.74 When "Congress use[s] ambiguous language in the statute
and confer[s] upon the agency a general grant of power to promul-
gate legislative rules to implement the statute," the agency is con-
sidered to have an implicit delegation of authority.75 Interpretive
rulemaking is used when an agency is not delegated the authority
to promulgate legislative rules in a statute but must still enforce
the statute.
1. Legislative rulemaking, while costly and complex, allows
substantial input from interested parties
Legislative rulemaking is a very involved process. The APA
provides two types of legislative rulemaking, formal and informal.77
If the statute does not require the agency to provide a hearing for
persons interested in the rulemaking process, the agency uses in-
formal rulemaking. 7 Formal rulemaking applies when the statute
requires that the rules be "made on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing."79 As Congress rarely compels hearings, in-
formal rulemaking is the norm." The Supreme Court ruled that
through the APA Congress generally "established the maximum
procedural requirements" of rulemaking. Therefore, although
agencies can increase the procedural rights granted by Congress,
courts cannot do so unless the agency has chosen to do so.2
Section 553 of the APA sets forth the requirements for infor-
73. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
74. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 6.3, at 236.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 234. However, agencies that are given the authority to make legis-
lative rules can also promulgate interpretive rules. See, e.g., National Family Plan-
ning & Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (demonstrating that the
Department of Health and Human Services promulgated both interpretive and legis-
lative rules). A rule that "clarifies a statutory term," "reminds parties of existing
statutory duties," or explains "'something the statute already require[s]' is an inter-
pretive rule. Id. at 236-37. A rule that supplements a statute, fills in the gaps, or
"'effect[s] a change in existing law or policy' is a legislative rule. Id. at 237.
77. See I DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.1, at 287-88.
78. See id. § 7.2, at 290.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); accord I DAvIs & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.2, at 290.
80. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.1, at 288.
81. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 (1978).
82. See id.
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mal rulemaking. Notice to the public followed by a comment pe-
riod for interested parties is obligatory. 3 After considering any
comments received, the agency must respond to all comments and
publish the final rule. 4 Interested parties who disagree with the
final rule then have "the right to petition for the issuance, amend-
ment, or repeal of a rule."
Although the informal rulemaking process appears simple,
once the courts are involved, it is not. The courts must use statu-
tory construction techniques to analyze whether the agency fol-
lowed the correct procedures in reaching its decision and whether
the agency reasonably interpreted the statute. 6 While both areas
are cause for concern by administrative agencies, the reasonable-
ness requirement is more difficult to satisfy.
Statutory construction is a process that involves looking at the
common meaning of each word, each word in conjunction with the
words around it, the statute as a whole, and the legislative history.8
If Congress's intent is clear, the agency must give effect to the
statute in the manner intended by Congress. 9 However, when the
intent is unclear, the federal agency uses its delegated rulemaking
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
84. See id. § 553(c)-(d).
85. Id. § 553(e).
86. One example of a case that overturned an agency's decision because of the
procedures followed is Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994). In Beno the
court held that the Secretary of Health and Human Services did not adequately ad-
dress the opposition to an agency rule. Id. at 1076. The case has been criticized as
"illustrat[ing] well the ability of judges to manipulate the malleable requirement of
reasoned decision-making to reject an agency action that is inconsistent with the
judges' personal ideological predilections." DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.4, at
101 (Supp. 1995); accord Beno, 30 F.3d at 1077 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("This
court is not empowered to review the merits of [the Secretary's] decision. It certainly
has no power to nit-pick nor second guess the policy judgment inherent in the
scheme.").
87. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.12, at 364-65 (noting the avoidance
of rulemaking procedures by agencies because the judiciary often finds agency inter-
pretations to be arbitrary or capricious).
88. See 2A SINGER, supra note 33, § 45.05, at 22-23.
89. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 117-18 (1978); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S.
261, 272, amended by, 392 U.S. 901 (1968); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S
374, 385 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965); Social Sec. Bd. v.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16
(1932); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331,342 (1896)).
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power to clarify the law.9" The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.9" held that even
when there may be a better or more reasonable construction avail-
able, agency regulations that are not "arbitrar~p capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute" will be upheld.
For example, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for a Great Oregon,93 the Endangered Species Act's definition
of the word "take" included the word "harm."9 4 The Secretary of
the Interior, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service,
interpreted "harm" as including any significant "habitat modifica-
tion or degradation" that kills or injures wildlife.95 The respon-
dents argued that Congress did not intend for the word "take" to
include habitat modification." The Senate deleted similar lan-
guage from the Senate bill before passing it. 7 The Ninth Circuit
held that the Director's definition of "harm" was too broad. s In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit believed the term should be read in the
context of the words around it.99 The Supreme Court reversed,
-finding that the Secretary "reasonably construed the intent of
Congress when he defined 'harm.'""00 The Court noted:
In the elaboration and enforcement of the [Endangered
Species Act], the Secretary and all persons who must
comply with the law will confront difficult questions of
proximity and degree; for.., the Act encompasses a vast
range of economic and social enterprises and endeavors.
These questions must be addressed in the usual course of
the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudica-
90. See id. at 843-44.
91. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
92. Id. at 844; accord Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1735 ("[T]he question before us is not
whether it represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents
a reasonable one."). The deference applied in the Chevron case applies to legislative
rules but probably does not apply to interpretive rules. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 69, § 6.3, at 235. This is because interpretive rules are not binding. See id.
93. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
94. See id. at 2410.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 2410-11.
98. See id. at 2411.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 2418. The Court specifically found that the definition was supported by
the dictionary definition of the word, by the broad purposes of the statute, and by
the grant of authority to the Secretary that excluded incidental acts that caused
harm. See id. at 2412-14.
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tion.101
Even with the deference afforded an agency interpretation by
the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron, convincing a court that
all of the requirements have been met in order to uphold an
agency rule promulgated through the legislative rulemaking proc-
ess is still difficult:
In order to avoid the risk of judicial reversal of a rule as
arbitrary or capricious, an agency must respond to all
major points made in comments, state the factual predi-
cates for its rule, support the factual predicates by linking
them to something in the record of the rulemaking, ex-
plain its reasons for resolving issues as it did, relate its
findings and its reasoning to decisional factors made rele-
vant by its statute, and give reasons for rejecting plausible
alternatives to the rule it adopted.'02
An agency does not have to reach scientific certainty in inter-
preting supportive data for rules,"' and the Supreme Court has
emphasized the need for deference when uncertain facts are in-
volved.1 4 Nevertheless, the mandatory amount of factual and evi-
dentiary support varies from court to court.105 Requirements range
from "unrealistic demands that agencies prove legislative facts that
cannot be proven or disproven, to acquiescence in rules predicated
on an agency's candid recognition that the legislative facts relevant
to its choice of rules are highly uncertain.''
In addition to the other hurdles faced by administrative agen-
cies, the executive branch may exert pressure on an agency to
adopt its preferred interpretation. 1°7 Because the agency's deci-
sion-makers are usually the President's own appointees, this type
101. Id. at 2418.
102. I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.1, at 289.
103. See id. § 7.5, at 322.
104. See id. at 331 (discussing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983)).
105. See id. at 321.
106. Id at 326; see also id. at 326-29 (illustrating unrealistically demanding court
opinions (citing International Ladies' Garment Worker's Union v. Donovan, 722
F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d
325 (2d Cir. 1977); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.
1976))).
107. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.9, at 354. Because the executive
branch is directly accountable to the voters, this might be one way for the public to
gain some input into the process.
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of executive pressure can be hard to resist. 108 Clearly, legislative
rulemaking is a difficult process for agencies, requiring input from
innumerable segments of society. Interpretive rulemaking in-
volves much less input from outside parties.0 9
2. Interpretive rulemaking allows only limited contribution from
interested parties and gives greater power to the courts to control
interpretations
Interpretive rules are unlike legislative rules in many impor-
tant respects. 10 First and most importantly, interpretive rules are
exempt from the notice and comment requirements imposed upon
the legislative rulemaking process, removing the chance for inter-
ested parties to critique a new interpretive rule before it is pub-
lished." Additionally, interpretive rules are not binding and only
serve to persuade courts that the agency has correctly interpreted
and applied the law."2 A court may give effect to these rules if it
agrees with the agency's reasoning, or it may choose another in-
terpretation."' Because the agency lacks legislative rulemaking
authority delegated by Congress, preenforcement judicial review is
not available for interpretive rules as it is for legislative rules."4
Finally, because the deference afforded to interpretive rulemaking
"is based solely on common sense,"'"5 it is much weaker than the
deference given to legislative rules under Chevron."6
Nevertheless, courts always consider and often follow inter-
pretive rules."7 Judges realize administrative agencies often have
the necessary time, experience, and resources for interpreting stat-
108. See id. Unless expressly forbidden by statute, such contact between the
agency and the executive branch is expected and permitted. See Sierra Club v. Cos-
tie, 657 F.2d 298,405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
109. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
110. Interpretive rules often appear not as rules, but in other forms, such as
guidelines or interpretative bulletins. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 141 (1976) (EEOC guidelines to Title VII claims); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 138 (1944) (interpretative bulletins of the Department of Labor's Wage &
Hour Division Administrator).
111. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 6.3, at 234.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 239.
114. Cf. id. § 7.4, at 312*(discussing the availability of preenforcement review for
legislative rules (citing Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967))).
115. Id. § 6.3, at 242.
116. See id.
117. See generally id. at 242-50 (discussing the persuasive effects of interpretive
rules).
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utes and considering alternatives."' In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,"9
for example, Congress did not delegate authority to the agency to
make legislative rules regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, but the Administrator was still charged with the duty to en-
force the statute."' In carrying out his duties, the Administrator
published agency opinions regarding the Act in "interpretive bul-
letins."' 2' The Supreme Court noted that "while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority," the interpretative
bulletins did "constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance."'1
As with legislative rulemaking, if the executive branch knows
an agency will be issuing interpretive rules, officials may exert
pressure on the decision-makers within the agency to decide in ac-
cord with the President.'2
3. Adjudication almost entirely avoids input from outside
administrative agencies and provides little certainty in
enforcement
To avoid the political, financial, and legal pitfalls of legislative
and interpretive rulemaking, an agency will sometimes announce
policies through adjudication, "claim[ing] that it does nothing but
resolve contested factual disputes.' 4 Adjudication completely
avoids the publication of general rules and merely applies the
agency's interpretations to specific individuals or practices.'2
While adjudication may be easier because of the lack of formal
rulemaking processes, legislative rulemaking has considerable ad-
vantages, such as: (1) providing higher quality rules, (2) allowing
public participation, (3) being subject to more political account-
ability, and (4) affording clearer public notice. Unfortunately,
118. See id. at 243.
119. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
120. See id. at 137-38.
121. See id. at 138.
122. Id. at 140.
123. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
124. I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.11, at 363; see also id. at 363-65
(discussing the decline of administrative rulemaking).
125. See id. at 363. For example, before adopting a legislative rule through formal
rulemaking procedures, the Comptroller of Currency issued interpretive letters and
amicus curiae briefs stating the agency's position on whether the definition of credit
card interest included late payment fees. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1734.
126. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 6.7, at 261-66.
[Vol. 30:893
TAKING AIM AT CANNED HUNTS
courts cannot require that agencies use the rulemaking process
over adjudication.
Adjudication involves "announcing a broad basis for a deci-
sion in an adjudicatory proceeding and applying the 'rule' of the
case as precedent."' ' No input from interested public parties is
taken."9 Because the legislative and executive branches rarely
have any notice before an agency adjudication sets forth a new
policy, there is little political accountability in the adjudicatory
process.3 ' It is also significant that an agency cannot apply a pol-
icy announced in a prior adjudication to a future case if relevant
facts are contested in the subsequent case.131 This is because adju-
dicatory decisions are fact specific.'
D. Agency Interpretations of the CEAPA Threaten to Exclude
Input From Interested Parties and Avoid Political Accountability
An act as vague and unclear as the CEAPA, which can be in-
terpreted in innumerable ways, really has no meaning until it is in-
terpreted by the enforcing federal agency.113 Depending on what
process the agency chooses to employ, the construction of the stat-
ute may be removed from the political process entirely because
Congress has completely given over its legislative power to the
ageny
As currently written the CEAPA does not delegate congres-
sional authority to any agency to promulgate legislative rules.
Without a specific mandate the enforcing agency cannot issue leg-
127. See id. § 6.8, at 267.
128. Id. § 6.7, at 260.
129. See id. at 262-63 (comparing the public notice requirement of rulemaking to
adjudication).
130. See id. at 262.
131. See id. § 6.8, at 271.
132. See id. Commentators on administrative law often argue that adjudication is
inferior to rulemaking because case-by-case adjudication does not "effect future
conduct and provide reasonably clear and objective standards for application to ad-
judicatory proceedings." Id § 6.7, at 261.
133. When laws and policies are unclear, the enforcing agency must still interpret
and implement them. See EDLES & NELSON, supra note 65, § 1.7H, at 18-19.
134. Commentators agree:
Conceptually, it is increasingly difficult to identify a source of political and
constitutional legitimacy for most policy decisions. To the extent that Con-
gress declines to make major policy decisions through statutory enactments
and chooses instead to delegate policymaking to agencies, it is impossible to
link policy decisions to the people through the politically accountable Leg-
islative Branch.
I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.9, at 351.
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islative rules.35 Therefore, the notice and comment requirements
of the APA for legislative rulemaking do not apply to the
CEAPA, and public input is greatly limited.'
36
If the agency enforcing the CEAPA chooses to use interpre-
tive rulemaking, lobbying and political pressure from the inter-
ested public to the executive branch might provide the public with
some secondhand input into decisions.' 37 This type of input is
tenuous at best, considering that the executive branch and the
public may be unaware that the agency intends to put forth an in-
terpretation. 38 Even if input from interested parties reaches the
agency through the executive branch and is adopted into the
agency interpretation, there is no guarantee the courts will accept
the agency's nonbinding interpretation. 39  Life-tenured federal
judges do not necessarily feel the same burden to respond to pub-
lic demands that elected members of the legislative and executive
branches do.'14 A judicial interpretation of the CEAPA would be
almost completely removed from the affected members of the
public. Because of the personal and financial nature of the inter-
ests at stake, leaving the CEAPA in the hands of the unaccount-
able would be detrimental to individuals on both sides of the
canned hunting issue who wish to have a say in the process.
If the enforcing agency chooses to employ adjudication over
interpretive rulemaking, the final outcome will be the same. The
bill is ambiguous, there is no requirement of public notice and
comment for adjudication, and the executive branch does not have
any way to exert pressure on an administrative tribunal.' 4' The
agency's tribunal can decide the issue in any way it sees fit.'42 Al-
135. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
136. Interpretive rulemaking is exempt from the notice and comment procedures
of the APA. See I DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 6.6, at 234. Adjudication avoids
both the notice and comment procedures and the publication of the rules, as it is
merely a method to adjudicate factual disputes. See id. §§ 6.7, 7.11, at 261-66, 363-65.
137. Cf id. § 7.9, at 354-55 (discussing the President's ability to pressure adminis-
trative agencies).
138. See id. at 356-57.
139. See supra Part III.C.2.
140. See, e.g., Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third
Century, 46 MERCER L. REv. 645, 645-46 (1995) ("[J]udicial independence means
simply that a life-tenured federal judge is free from all political and other outside
pressures to decide cases in a wholly impartial manner.").
141. See supra Part III.C.3.
142. See I DAviS & PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.11, at 363 ("If an agency announces
all 'rules' in adjudications, it can deny the policy component of its actions, claim that
it does nothing but resolve contested factual disputes, and avoid alerting Congress or
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though judicial review is available, as it is with interpretive rule-
making, the judicial process is equally free from public input. 43
Interpretive rulemaking and adjudication, the two most likely
interpretation mechanisms for the CEAPA,144 leave much to be
desired from the standpoint of the concerned public. By generat-
ing legislation as imprecise as the CEAPA without a method for
public input, Congress passes the buck, leaving interested parties
without recourse.
IV. REGULATING AT THE STATE LEVEL PROVIDES THE DIVERSITY
NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE STATES, THE
ANIMALS, AND THE HUNTERS
State regulation currently addresses many of the concerns
raised by proponents of the CEAPA, and it does so in a manner
that is better suited to the needs of the citizens of each state, the
animals, the hunters, and the ranch owners.' 45 All states regulate
hunting. 46 Many states currently have, or are considering, legisla-
tion aimed at canned hunts and other inhumane practices.' 47 These
laws can be found in state codes and regulations limiting game
ranches or in separate legislation aimed directly at canned hunts.14'
These state laws demonstrate the need for the diversity of ap-
proaches provided by legislating at the state level.
Section 2124 of the California Fish and Game Code prevents
the possession, purchase, sale, or transfer of wild mammals for the
purpose of killing or injuring the animals for sport, gain, or
amusement. 49 -Section 2118 prevents the importation of many
species of wild animals into the state 5 These sections are very
broad, preventing the operation of all game ranches within the
state and consequently making all canned hunts illegal.' As a
the White House of its plan to implement a new policy it prefers.").
143. See id. § 6.7, at 262.
144. This is because legislative rulemaking authority is not delegated to any
agency under the CEAPA. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
145. See infra Part V.C.
146. Cf Steve Kesteron, Revenue from Hunting and Fishing Boosts State's Econ-
omy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 1994, at Lake Sentinel 8 (stating that "[a]ll 50
states collected $791 million" in hunting and fishing license revenues in 1993).
147. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
148. For example, compare the general hunting legislation of California, CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE § 2124 (West Supp. 1996), with the more specific canned hunt
rule in Florida, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 39-12.010(5)(e) (Supp. 1996).
149. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2124.
150. See id. § 2118.
151. See id. §§ 2118, 2124; see, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5
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protective measure for the venison industry, section 2124 does
have a specific exclusion for the "raising [of] deer to produce veni-
son for market." 2
In 1995 the State of Virginia passed legislation requiring
"shooting enclosures"153 to be licensed and limiting the animals
that can be killed in such enclosures to sheep, goats, and swine, ef-
fectively eliminating canned hunts."' Among other things, Vir-
ginia's Board of Agriculture and Consumer Services is authorized
under this legislation to specify the species of animals that may be
held, establish the minimum acreage for enclosures, and set the
requirements for the humane care and killing of the animals.55
In Florida canned hunts are banned through the imposition of
a minimum acreage requirement that is much smaller than that of
the CEAPA. Chapter 39-12.010 of the State's Administrative
Code reads: "Game mammals taken on hunting preserves shall
not be boxed or caged, but free-roaming on not less than 100
acres."
156
In addition to numerous other laws and regulations placed on
hunting in the state, Texas passed an act in 1995 that prohibits the
killing of exotics such as lions, tigers, leopards, cheetahs, hyenas,
bears, elephants, wolves, rhinoceroses, or hybrids of these ani-
mals.'7 The Texas Parks and Wildlife Code provides that no per-
son may kill or attempt to injure these animals when they are held
under control, penned, or released from captivity so they can be
killed.15 This legislation is aimed at preventing canned hunts of
dangerous exotics.1
51
The New York State Assembly and Senate introduced a bill
banning canned hunts in March of 1995.16 This bill, while similar
to the CEAPA,, is more strict because it stringently regulates the
sale of exotics by "exhibition, scientific, educational or amuse-
(statement of George E. Brown, Jr., Rep. (D-Cal.)) (noting that California has
"ban[ned] the shooting of exotics outright").
152. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2124(a).
153. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-763.5:1 (Michie 1996) (defining a "shooting enclo-
sure" as any fenced area available to the public for commercial shooting).
154. See id. § 3.1-763.5:2, :6.
155. See id. § 3.1-763.5:5(B).
156. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 39-12.010(5)(e).
157. See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.101-.107 (West Supp. 1996).
158. See id. § 62.101-.102.
159. See id. § 62.101-.107.
160. See A.B. 5363-A, 218th Leg., 1995-96 Sess. (N.Y. 1995); S.B. 3721-A, 218th
Leg., 1995-96 Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
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ment" organizations to game ranches.' 6' The bill places a heavy
burden on the seller to determine that the buyer does not intend to
use the animal in a canned hunt.
On March 20, 1996, the Pennsylvania legislature was pre-
sented with a bill to prohibit the unlawful assistance or participa-
tion in a canned hunt.'6' This bill is significantly more far reaching
than the CEAPA. The Pennsylvania bill defines a "canned hunt"
as a hunt of any mammal held in an enclosure of any size; it would
make all canned hunts and game ranches illegal in Pennsylvania.'
6
The State of Montana "has not taken a position on the hunt-
ing of exotic game animals on game ranches.' 16' However, the
State's Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks "is in the process
of reviewing statutes regarding importation and possession of ex-
otic animals with an option to propose legislation limiting exotic
species in Montana.',
66
Many other states, such as Maryland, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, have strong regulations in place that restrict the hunting
or killing of exotics.'67 These state laws are all that is necessary.
V. STATE REGULATION OF CANNED HUNTS ADEQUATELY
PROTECTS ALL OF THE ARTICULATED INTERESTS OF THE CEAPA
SUPPORTERS
A. Canned Hunts Are Not a Serious Problem Requiring Federal
Intervention
Canned hunts are not the serious, widespread problem that
proponents of the CEAPA would have the public believe. The
1,000 operations Congressmen Brown and Goss refer to do not
exist. Rather, they are legitimate game ranches, which are regu-
lated by their respective states.68 Proponents of the CEAPA cite
161. N.Y. A.B. 5363-A; N.Y. S.B. 3721-A.
162. See N.Y. A.B. 5363-A; N.Y. S.B. 3721-A.
163. See S.B. 1459, 180th Leg., 1996 Sess. (Pa. 1996).
164. See id.
165. Letter from Karen Zackheim, Game Farm Program Coordinator, Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, to Richard M. Patch, Humane Society
(Apr. 8, 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
166. Id.
167. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of George E.
Brown, Jr., Rep. (D-Cal.)).
168. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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four specific instances of canned hunts.169 Of these four, three of
the offenders were prosecuted under existing laws.7 There are
some reports of canned hunts in states that currently have no pre-
ventative regulations, 7' but very little evidence demonstrates that
canned hunts occur on a regular basis in the United States.172 In
addition, any perceived problems in states without laws prohibiting
canned hunts can be addressed by additional legislation at the
state level.
B. The CEAPA Does Not Adequately Address the Interests of the
Individual States
Different interests exist in each state with regard to the regu-
lation of hunting within its borders.' Some states derive signifi-
cant income from the operation of game ranches;' 74 in others
hunting may be the only viable use of land that is environmentally
sensitive."75 These states would be substantially harmed if the
CEAPA were enacted because all game ranches under 1,000 acres
would be closed. 76 In contrast, some states have little to no inter-
est in the issue because of the limited number of game ranches
within their borders.'7 There is also the fact that citizens of less
urban states hunt more for sport and recreation, often viewing
169. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-4 (statement of Wayne
Pacelle, Vice President of Government Affairs and Media, Humane Society); id. at 4
(statement of Ike C. Sugg, Competitive Enterprise Inst.).
170. See id1 at 4 (statement of Ike C. Sugg, Competitive Enterprise Inst.); id. at 3
(statement of Pete Geren, Rep. (D-Tex.)).
171. See Lubrano, supra note 23 (reporting on canned hunts in Pennsylvania).
172. One of the canned hunts used as an example by the Humane Society may
have been perpetrated by undercover animal rights activists in order to get film foot-
age of a canned hunt for publicity purposes. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brewster, Rep. (D-Okla.)).
There is an undercover investigator for the Humane Society who claims to
have been to "more canned hunts than any other person in America." Lubrano, su-
pra note 23.
173. "Texas is fortunate to have unique climate and topography that permits the
introduction and propagation of nonindigenous wildlife. The expertise of Texas of-
ficials-working with our ranching and agriculture community-has permitted our
state to effectively manage and enhance this wildlife diversity." House Subcomm.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Lamar Smith, Rep. (R-Tex.)).
174. See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (statement of Lamar Smith, Rep. (R-Tex.)) (emphasizing
the importance of the game ranching industry to Texas).
175. See, e.g., Cattlemen's Comments, supra note 37, at 4.
176. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
177. For example, only two large game ranches operate in the State of New
Hampshire. See New Hampshire Fish and Game Commission Resolution (adopted
Sept. 21,1994) (on file with LOYOLA OF Los ANGELES LAw REVIEW).
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hunting as part of their heritage. 78 Certainly it cannot be argued
that the average citizen of New York City and the average citizen
of Helena, Montana have the same general views toward hunt-
ing.
179
For similar reasons arbitrary national standards, such as the
1,000 acre requirement of the CEAPA, are not a sensible means of
regulating the size of enclosures. Each state has its own topogra-
phy. One thousand acres of mountainous terrain is significantly
different from 1,000 acres of desert or swamp. Each state can take
terrain into account when drafting laws with minimum or maxi-
mum enclosure size.'
In addition, land availability in the fifty states is extraordinar-
ily diverse. While most fame ranches in Texas and many in Flor-
ida are extremely large,' such large continuous tracts of land are
not necessarily available or affordable anymore in other states'8
Also, due to both the terrain and the animals' natural instincts,
some animals need very little space to avoid hunters, while others
need large amounts. ' State legislatures can take these variances
into account when considering minimum acreage requirements.
As compared to state laws, which can be well tailored, the
CEAPA does not allow for variation. States where canned hunt-
ing is not a problem and states that do not allow any hunting of
exotics may have no need to pass additional animal cruelty laws to
178. See Andy Hansroth, Husky Musky Anglers Release Their Biggest Fish,
SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Sept. 10, 1995, at 9D (explaining that the most popular
outdoor sports range from saltwater fishing and hunting in Houston to calisthenics in
Chicago to tennis in New York City).
179. See Fair Game Only, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 25, 25 (stating that people
who live in cities view "hunters not as muscular outdoorsmen, but as blood- and
beer-seeking bambi killers").
180. Tennessee, for example, limits the size of game ranches to a maximum of 640
acres. See TENN. WILD. RESOURCES AGENCY R. ch. 1660-1-11-.02(4)(a) (1994). For
that reason passage of the CEAPA would close all game ranches in the state.
181. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Wayne
Pacelle, Vice President of Government Affairs and Media, Humane Society); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 39-12.010(2) (Supp. 1996) (limiting the maximum size of game
ranches to 5,000 acres).
182. In 1992, for example, two million acres of farmland and over 300,000 acres of
wetlands were developed. See Fair Game Only, supra note 179.
183. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of John Tanner,
Rep. (D-Tenn.)) (explaining that a boar needs very little land area to evade hunters);
NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 31 ("Many species of exotic animals require much less
than 1000 acres to.. . elude a hunter... Russian boar, for example, require much
less than 1000 acres to forage successfully and to have the ability to elude a
hunter.").
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adequately protect exotics from canned hunts. 184 States that derive
significant income from the operation of game ranches can nar-
rowly tailor their canned hunt laws to ensure that the only kills
prevented under the statutes are those where the animals are in
small enclosures or are staked in place."" Where large areas of
undeveloped land exist, states can require minimum acreage for
game ranches; states with less land availability can restrict the
species of exotics to be hunted, taking into consideration the ter-
rain, rather than compelling a minimum size.'86
C. Laws Banning Canned Hunts and Preventing Other Inhumane
Practices Are More Effective and Less Expensive at the State Level
Enforcement of laws prohibiting canned hunts will be more ef-
fective at the state level. States already have mechanisms in place
to enforce their hunting regulations and their laws prohibiting
cruelty to animals.)' For example, consider the four instances of
canned hunting cited by proponents of the CEAPA. The shooter,
the ranch owner, or both were punished for their crimes under
state laws and federal endangered species laws in at least three of
the four cases."
Furthermore, the cost of enforcing the CEAPA is prohibitive
184. Cf CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2124 (West Supp. 1996) (eliminating all
hunting of exotics on game ranches in California); House Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 1, at 2 (statement of John Tanner, Rep. (D-Tenn.)) ("Ron Fox, the [Tennessee
Wildlife Resources Agency's] [A]ssistant [D]irector, tells us that over the past dec-
ade they have had no significant problems with the management of [game ranch]
facilities."); New Hampshire Fish and Game Commission Resolution (adopted Sept.
21, 1994) (stating that New Hampshire has two game ranches); Letter from Doug
Hansen, Director, Wildlife Division, South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and
Parks, to Richard M. Patch, Legislative Assistant, Humane Society of the United
States (Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (explaining
that South Dakota has no canned hunting laws and there is no known canned hunt-
ing problem in the state).
185. Texas already has a canned hunt law on its books, TEx. PARKS & WILD.
CODE ANN. § 62.101-.107 (West Supp. 1996), as does Florida, FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 39-12.010(5)(e).
186. Cf TENN. WILD. RESOURCES AGENCY R. ch. 1660-1-11-.02(4)(a) (limiting the
size of game ranches to 640 acres).
187. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Randy "Duke"
Cunningham, Rep. (R-Cal.)).
188. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also House Subcomm. Hear-
ings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brewster, Rep. (D-Okla.)) (stating that one
of the individuals convicted received a sentence with a $25,000 fine and jail time);
Caged Hunting, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at A20 (referring to the killing of a
black leopard where the hunter was fined $2,000 and the guide was sentenced to
prison).
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and inequitable. The agency would have to set up rules through
rulemaking or adjudication at a substantial cost to taxpayers, and
any amount spent in the set up and administration of the Act
would be increased by the cost of enforcement. 9 A federal pro-
gram under the CEAPA would undoubtedly be expensive to en-
force.r There would be a nightmare of paperwork, requiring a
method of tracking the transportation, transfer, and possession of
exotic animals both within and between states. 91 In addition, large
scale record keeping on the history and whereabouts of each ani-
mal would be necessary to determine which exotics were covered
by the CEAPA.'92 Where the federal government will get the
money for enforcement is not addressed in the CEAPA.
When an individual state finds the need to enhance its laws,
the citizens of that state bear the cost of the additional enforce-
ment measures.'93 Under a national program all citizens share the
tax burden equally. As a result, whether fair or not, the citizens
of a state that contains five game ranches and the citizens of a state
that contains five hundred will pay an equal share of the CEAPA's
cost of enforcement. Such cost sharing only makes sense if the
purpose of the bill is to preserve exotics for all Americans. Unfor-
tunately, the CEAPA's more likely result would be to decrease
populations of exotics.' 5
189. Agency rulemaking can be time-consuming and expensive. See I DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 69, § 7.11, at 363, 365. Each instance of adjudication involves the
time and expense associated with a proceeding before an administrative law judge.
See EDLES & NELSON, supra note 65, § 1.8, at 28. This can be more time consuming
than rulemaking. See id
190. The cost of enforcement is unknown. However, there are always costs asso-
ciated with enforcing a new statute that requires active monitoring, such as the
CEAPA. Cf Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1001,
1083-84 (1995) (discussing why Congress would want to pass unfunded mandatory
federal laws to be implemented by each state in order to save the federal govern-
ment the expense of implementation on a national scale).
191. Record keeping would be required to implement the CEAPA's goal of con-
gressional oversight over the interstate transport of exotics. See House Subcomm.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of George E. Brown, Jr., Rep. (D-Cal.)).
192. Without some record keeping on the history of each exotic, there would be
no way to determine if an animal killed or injured met the definition of a confined
exotic animal under the CEAPA. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
193. See Caminker, supra note 190, at 1083-84.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brew-
ster, Rep. (D-Okla.)).
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D. The CEAPA Threatens Private Breeding Programs
The CEAPA does not take into account the importance of the
game ranching industry to the preservation of many species of ex-
otic wildlife. 9 Private game ranches raise exotics in order to make
a profit. 97 This is true whether the animals are hunted; slaugh-
tered for human consumption; or sold to zoos, other game ranches,
or individuals for breeding purposes.'98 The profit motive encour-
ages game ranches to breed animals that many people would not
otherwise breed."9 If these animals are dying off in the wild, game
ranches can serve as a method of preserving the species.20
For example, the Bontebok Antelope, an endangered species,
was almost extinct in the wild, but there are now over 1,750 on
South African game ranches.2°  Twenty-nine of the remaining
thirty-one bloodlines of the rare Scimitar-homed Oryx have been
preserved by a Texas game rancher.20 Approximately 200 Upland
Barasingha Deer are left in central India, and over 180 of the same
species live on a game ranch in Texas. 23 The Indian Blackbuck
Antelope and the North African Aoudad Ram were both reintro-
duced into their native habitats using animals raised on game
ranches. °4
As long as there is a commercial market for exotics, private
game ranches will help to preserve species at no cost to the gov-
ernment or taxpayers05 If the CEAPA abolishes the majority of
game ranches, the unlimited potential of these operations as a
method of exotic animal conservation will also be destroyed.26
196. See id.
197. See Sugg, supra note 25.
198. Cf Jim Steinberg, Deer Framing Comes to S. Texas, CORPUS CHRISTI
CALLER-TIMES, June 5, 1994, at DI (discussing a game ranch in Texas that raises
Axis Deer for hunting, venison, and commercial purposes).
199. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brewster,
Rep. (D-Okla.)); see generally Sugg, supra note 25 (explaining how the profit motive
resulted in increased populations of exotics).
200. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brewster,
Rep. (D-Okla.)).
201. See id. at 10-11 (statement of Ike C. Sugg, Competitive Enterprise Inst.).
202. See Sugg, supra note 25 (referring to game ranch owner David Bamberger).
203. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-2 (statement of Richard
Winters, Jr., President, Exotic Wildlife Association).
204. See id. (statement of Bill K. Brewster, Rep. (D-Okla.)).
205. See Sugg, supra note 25 (noting the important role of economic incentives in
conserving endangered species).
206. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Bill K. Brewster,
Rep. (D-Okla.)).
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VI: CONCLUSION
Two good alternatives to the CEAPA are available: (1) revis-
ing the CEAPA so it genuinely addresses the issue of canned hunts
or (2) eliminating the bill entirely, relying instead on the states to
legislate hunting of exotics.
If federal legislators insist on responding to the issue of
canned hunts, even though it is not a serious problem, the CEAPA
must be rewritten. In its current form, the CEAPA's ambiguity
causes it to reach far beyond the prevention of canned hunts with-
out even necessarily protecting exotics from canned hunts. The
ambiguity of the text removes the interpretation of the statute
from the politically accountable and places it into the hands of
administrative agencies or the judiciary at a significant cost to
United States taxpayers.
If legislators desire to rewrite the CEAPA, they should refer
to some of the legislation at the state level. For example, Florida's
canned hunt legislation has been in place for several years. The
applicable provision states, "Game mammals taken on hunting
preserves shall not be boxed or caged, but free-roaming on not less
than 100 acres." 2° This simple statement is more narrowly tailored
than the CEAPA, and if successful in Florida,208 it might serve as a
model for federal legislation.
The wording of any new federal statute should be clear and
well defined. In addition, the individuals targeted by the law must
be explicitly stated in the revised bill; the focus should be on pun-
ishing the shooter and the person who arranges the canned hunt,
rather than on third parties. The legislation should not be limited
to animals killed for sport or trophies; this requires reading the
shooter's mind. The law should instead include all game animals
killed in the prohibited manner, including exotic as well as native
wildlife. All game animals are thus protected from the inhumane
practices because a canned hunt has occurred whether the animal
killed is native or exotic. Exemptions for animals that are ranched
for human consumption and animals that must be put down by
veterinarians for medical reasons should be added. In addition, if
207. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 39-12.010(5)(e) (Supp. 1996). Changing the
wording to "boxed, caged, tied, or otherwise unable to flee" would be better than
limiting it to "boxed or caged."
208. No statistics discussing the number of prosecutions under Florida's law are
publicly available. However, Florida legislators most likely have access to such in-
formation. They could provide it to the drafters of the CEAPA if it is rewritten.
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native wildlife are included in the legislation, exceptions for farm-
ers and other land owners disposing of troublesome native animals
will be necessary. The federal agency selected to implement the
CEAPA should be stated in the bill at the outset for the informa-
tion of interested parties. Congress should require formal rule-
making, so interested parties will have input into the interpretation
of the CEAPA through the administrative agency. Most impor-
tantly, the purpose of the statute should be plainly set forth in an-
ticipation of the inevitable need for additional interpretation.
Because it will be very difficult for Congress to draft a clear,
unambiguous bill prohibiting canned hunts, the preferable alter-
native is to let individual states, which are better equipped, enact
and enforce legislation preventing canned hunts. States can ad-
dress the needs of their citizens and the needs of the animals in a
more appropriate manner than the federal government. Any at-
tempt to regulate at a national level will only serve to create an
expensive exercise in statutory construction and government bu-
reaucracy.
These alternatives are assuredly unacceptable to people who
desire to put an end to game ranches in the United States. How-
ever, the genuine will of the public can be more easily discerned by
allowing the states to regulate exclusively or by narrowly tailoring
new federal legislation. Either of these solutions will overcome
any veiled attempt to mislead Congress into enacting legislation
that seriously damages the game ranching industry and threatens
the continued existence and growth of many species of exotics.
Jamie Elizabeth Wrage"
This Comment is dedicated with love to Bernice Addy Grubbs and James C.
Grubbs, Jr.
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